Decision Analysis Working Paper Abstract
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WP030012
|
Title: How “Decison Aid” Can Mislead Deciders Due to Conflicts
of Interest
Authors: Rex
Brown George Mason Universtiy
Date: January 2003
Status: Under Revision for Interfaces
Quantitative aids often squander their potential to improve decisions.
The logic of an aid may be sound enough, but if it fails other essential
tests of usefulness (such as sound input and appropriate output) a trusting
decider can be worse off than before. One major reason for the failures
is that the aider’s priorities may conflict with the decider’s. The aid
may employ models of little use, because they are tractable and interesting.
It may disregard important knowledge, because it cannot be validated. It
may make unrealistic assumptions, because they are convenient. The decider
may have to take control of the aiding process to protect his interests;
by specifying what the aid is to do, by checking the assumptions it is
based on, and by directing how it is to be used. The argument is illustrated
with examples drawn from extensive consulting.
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